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The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue.  Most empirical estimates
rely on inference from non experimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a pro-competitive policy
reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government
introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between  hospitals. Patients were given choice
of location for hospital care and provided information on the quality and timeliness of care. Prices,
previously negotiated between buyer and seller, were set centrally under a DRG type system. Using
this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design we estimate the impact of the
introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. Our
data set is large, containing information on approximately 68,000 discharges per year per hospital
from 162 hospitals. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. Patients
discharged from hospitals located in markets where competition was more feasible were less likely
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Health care is one of the most important industries in developed countries, both 
because of its size and impact on well-being.
1 Historically, health care has been 
provided through centralized, non-market means in most countries outside of the 
United States. However, recently market oriented reforms have been adopted or are 
being considered in many countries, including the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Israel, 
and Australia, despite a lack of strong evidence on the effects of market reforms in 
health care. In the US markets have long been used for the delivery of health care. 
However, massive consolidation among hospitals has led to concerns about the 
functioning of these markets.
2  These developments raise questions as to whether pro-
market reforms are an appropriate way of improving outcomes in health care. 
 
A central concern about the functioning of markets in health care is whether 
competition will deliver the socially optimal quality of care (Sage et al. 2003; Federal 
Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 2004). Quality is a major issue in 
health care, first because the effect of quality on an individual's well-being can be 
very great and second, due to the widespread presence of insurance against health care 
expenditures (the US), or provision of care free of charge (UK, Europe), health care 
consumers are not exposed to the full expense associated with their health care 
decisions so that quality looms larger in consumer choice than price.   
 
In the last few years a relatively small, but important, literature has emerged on 
competition and quality in health care markets (see Gaynor 2006, for a review). The 
results are mixed. Economic theory suggests that competition will increase quality in 
markets with regulated prices (provided price is above marginal cost). The models 
largely derive from analyses of industries subject to price regulation up until the 
1970s and 1980s, e.g., airlines and taxis, but there are also some models specific to 
                                                 
1 Health care accounts for 16% of GDP in the US, 8.4% in the UK, and 9.5% on average across 
Western Europe and Canada. 
2 For example, Haas-Wilson (2003), Sage et al. (2003), Federal Trade Commission and U.S. 
Department of Justice (2004), Cuellar and Gertler (2005), Vogt and Town (2006). Critics of the use of 




3 The intuition of all these models is as follows. Price is regulated, so firms 
compete for consumers on non-price dimensions, i.e. “quality.” If the regulated price 
is set above marginal cost at some baseline level of quality, then firms will increase 
quality to try to gain market share. This will continue until profits are zero.  
 
The empirical evidence is almost entirely from the US Medicare program, and mostly 
from treatment of heart attack patients. Most of this evidence (discussed later in this 
section) finds that competition with fixed prices improves quality.
4 However, with 
one exception (Cooper et al. 2010), the existing studies exploit changes in cross 
sectional variation in levels of market structure over time to identify the impact of 
competition.  
 
In this paper we exploit a policy change in the UK National Health Service (NHS) to 
identify the effect of competition on health care quality. Our identification comes both 
from variation in market structure, as in previous studies, but also from a large policy 
change designed to promote competition. In 2006 the NHS adopted a payment system 
in which hospitals were paid fixed, regulated, prices for treating patients (similar to 
the Medicare hospital payment system in the US) and mandated that all patients 
requiring treatment be given the choice of five different hospitals. Prior to this reform, 
the local public agencies responsible for purchasing health care on behalf of the 
population in their area engaged in selective contracting with hospitals, bargaining 
over price and quantity.  The reform therefore provided patients with more choice, 
both via the mandated five alternatives and the end of selective contracting, and 
moved hospitals from a market determined price environment to a regulated price 
environment.  Greater choice should increase the (quality) elasticity of demand faced 
by hospitals, which should intensify competition. In addition, the shift from selective 
contracting to fixed prices should focus competition on quality.   
 
                                                 
3 See for example, Douglas and Miller (1974), Schmalensee (1977), Vander Weide and Zalkind (1981) 
and White (1972) on airlines, and Frankena and Pautler (1984) on taxicabs. On health care, see for 
example, Allen and Gertler (1991), Held and Pauly (1983) and Pope (1989). 
4 When prices are market determined, however, there is no general theoretical prediction of the effect 
of competition on quality. The empirical literature mirrors that indeterminacy. There are studies that 
find that competition decreases quality (e.g., Propper et al. 2004), and those that find the opposite effect 
(e.g., Sari 2002). All of these studies use variation in market structure for identification.   
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We use the introduction of the policy in 2006, interacted with market structure, to 
identify the impact of market concentration on quality. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate our 
approach. They show the unconditional relationship between hospital quality (as 
measured by mortality) and market structure (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index, HHI) before and after the reform.
5 Figure 1a presents a 
commonly used measure of hospital quality – the mortality rates for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI, commonly known as a heart attack).
6 The red lines show the 
smoothed nonparametric relationship between mortality and market structure. The left 
hand panel shows that mortality is clearly higher in less concentrated markets before 
the reform. But post-reform the direction of the association has been reversed and 
mortality is lower in unconcentrated markets. The same pattern is observed in Figure 
1b, which plots all-cause hospital mortality rates against the HHI.   
 
These figures strongly suggest that the reform intensified competition and that 
intensified competition post-reform led to increased quality.  The paper subjects this 
hypothesis to rigorous testing and examines, in contrast with most of the prior 
literature, not only deaths from AMI as the measure of quality but a range of other 
quality measures and at other outcomes, including hospital utilization and 
expenditure. We find that the introduction of competition led to an increase in quality 
without a commensurate increase in expenditure.  
 
Our research contributes to the empirical literature on competition and quality in 
health care. The most prominent study of markets with fixed prices is Kessler and 
McClellan (2000), who examine the impact of market concentration on mortality for 
Medicare heart attack patients. They find that mortality is substantially and 
significantly higher for patients in more concentrated markets. Kessler and Geppert 
(2005) find that high risk Medicare patients’ heart attack mortality is higher in highly 
concentrated markets, while there is no such effect for low risk patients. Tay (2003) 
estimates a model of hospital choice for Medicare patients and finds that demand is 
responsive to quality, again measured by heart attack mortality, implying the potential 
for quality competition. Shen (2003) finds that the number of hospitals interacted with 
the Medicare payment leads to reduced Medicare patient heart attack mortality after 
                                                 
5 These estimates are adjusted for differences in severity between hospital populations. 
6 We discuss the use of mortality as an indicator of quality in section IV.A.  
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1990. In the one paper from outside the US, Cooper et al. (2010) examine the effect of 
the current pro-market reforms in the UK on heart attack mortality and find the 
reforms reduced AMI mortality in less concentrated markets relative to more 
concentrated markets. In contrast, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003), using similar 
methods to Kessler and McClellan (2000), find that mortality is higher for Medicare 
heart attack and pneumonia patients receiving care in less concentrated markets in the 
Los Angeles area and Mukamel et al. (2001) find no effect of market concentration on 
mortality from all causes for Medicare patients.   
 
Our research also contributes to the growing evidence on the impact of competition in 
public services.  There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in competition 
in education, both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Epple and Romano 1998; 
Hoxby 2000; Epple, Figlio, and Romano 2004). In this literature, as in health, the 
predictions from theoretical models are often ambiguous and the empirical evidence 
quite contested (e.g., Hoxby 2000; Rothstein 2007; Bayer and McMillan 2005; for a 
review see Burgess, Propper and Wilson 2005). Our results thus add to the evidence 
on the conditions under which gains from competition in the provision of public 
services may be realized. 
 
In what follows, we provide background on the NHS and the market oriented reforms 
of 2006 (Section II), present our empirical strategy (Section III), describe the data 
(Section IV), present our results and report on an extensive set of robustness tests 
(Section V), and provide a summary and conclusions (Section VI).   
 
II. The reform program  
 
A.  The NHS reforms 
In the UK health care is tax financed and free at the point of use. All primary care and 
almost all hospital care is funded and provided in the National Health Service (NHS).  
Primary care is provided in the community by publicly funded physicians known as  
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General Practitioners (GPs), who also act as the “gate keeper” for hospital based care.  
Secondary care is provided in publicly funded public (NHS) hospitals.
7 
 
Prior to 1991 funding was allocated to public bodies at the local level (local health 
authorities), who were responsible for running hospitals. From 1991 the roles of buyer 
and seller of hospital based health care were separated, with the intention of 
promoting competition between public hospitals. The local health authorities were 
given the task of buying hospital based health care for their population.
8 Hospitals 
were turned into free standing public organisations, known as NHS Trusts, who 
competed for contracts from the buyers.
9 Both price and quality were negotiable, 
though information on quality was extremely limited (Propper et al. 2008). In 1997 
the newly elected Labour administration retained the architecture of the buyer and 
seller split but changed policy to reduce competition and to implement instead longer 
term cooperative relationships between buyers and sellers. In this regime, which was 
similar to selective contracting in the US,
10 buyers and sellers negotiated over price, 
quality (mainly waiting times), and volume on an annual basis, with the majority of 
contracts taking the form of annual bulk-purchasing contracts.  
  
In late 2002 the government signalled a shift in policy and initiated a reform package 
with a set of phased-in changes leading to the re-introduction of competition from 
2006 onwards.
11 There were several elements to this policy (Farrar et al. 2007; 
Cooper et al. 2010), the most important of which were a policy designed to increase 
                                                 
7 There is a small private sector. Around 15 percent of the population have private health insurance 
which is a complement to, rather than a substitute for NHS care. Private medical insurance is not tax 
deductible and covers care in the small private sector, which specializes in the hospital based provision 
of non-acute services for which there are long NHS waiting lists. There are also some private sector 
providers of NHS care (known as Independent Sector Treatment Centres) but they account for less than 
1% of all hospital activity.  
8 These buyers were known as District Health Authorities (DHAs). Health authorities covered an 
administratively defined geographical area containing around 100,000 patients.   
9 Although purchasers were given the right to buy from whichever supplier of health care they wished, 
in practice, almost all care purchased by NHS purchasers was bought from NHS Trusts. Relatively 
little business went to the very small private sector. 
10 Health insurance plans in the US typically form provider networks for their enrollees. Enrollees are 
covered for care obtained from providers in the network, and either have no coverage outside of the 
network or have to pay substantially more. Insurers selectively contract with hospitals and doctors to be 
in their network. This includes negotiation over prices (and possibly some other factors), with the 
understanding that the provider will receive a substantial volume of patients from the insurer.   
11 The NHS uses financial years which run April 1
st to 31
st March. In the description of the reforms we 
give precise dates of policy announcements. In the rest of the paper we refer to full years by the first 
calendar year which the financial year spans.  
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patient choice and a change in hospital payments from negotiated to ex ante fixed 
prices. 
 
Patient choice was introduced in January 2006. Prior to this date, patients were 
referred by their GPs to the local hospital that provided the service they required and 
were not offered generally offered any choice over the location of their care.
12 Post 
January 2006 patients had to be offered a choice of five providers for their hospital 
care (Department of Health 2004) and GPs were required (and paid) to ensure that 
patients were made aware of, and offered, choice.
13 Along with giving patients a 
formal choice of where they could receive secondary care, the government also 
introduced a new information system that enabled paperless referrals and appointment 
bookings and provided information on quality to help patients make more informed 
choices. This system, known as ‘Choose and Book’, allows patients to book hospital 
appointments online, with their GP, or by telephone. The booking interface gives the 
person booking the appointment the ability to search for hospitals based on 
geographic distance and see estimates of each hospital’s waiting time.
14 Patient choice 
therefore signalled the end of selective contracting by encouraging movement of 
patients away from the local hospitals GPs had previously used. 
 
The ex ante fixed prices are a case-based payment system known as ‘Payment by 
Results’ (PbR) (Department of Health 2002b). PbR is modelled on the diagnosis-
related group (DRG) payment system used by the Medicare program and many 
private insurers in the US (Department of Health 2002a). A fixed price is set by the 
government for every procedure, with adjustments for whether a hospital was an 
academic centre, patient severity and local wage rates (Department of Health 
                                                 
12 The hospitals to which patients were sent were determined by the selective contracting arrangements 
made by the local NHS body responsible for purchasing healthcare (the Primary Care Trust, PCT).  
13 In April 2008, choice was extended so that patients could choose any hospital in England, as long as 
the hospital met NHS standards and were paid using the NHS ex ante fixed tariff (Department of 
Health 2007; Department of Health 2009). 
14 From 2007 the government also introduced a website designed to provide additional quality 
information to inform patients’ choices. This included information collected by the national hospital 
accreditation bodies, including risk-adjusted mortality rates and detailed information on waiting times, 
infection rates and hospital activity rates for particular procedures as well as information on hospital 
accessibility, general visiting hours and parking arrangements (Choose and Book website 2010, 




15 The price is exogenous to both seller and the buyer. The aims were that 
hospitals would only receive payment if they attracted patients (Le Grand 2007; 
Dixon 2004) and that fixed prices would mean that choice would depend on quality, 
and not price as in the previous system (Department of Health 2003).   
 
In 2003 PbR was used for a very limited number of procedures (15 elective 
procedures) and only for purchases from a small group of hospitals (known as 
Foundation Trusts, FTs). In the following year it was extended to a wider set of 
elective spells and non elective spells in FTs. In 2005 it was also applied to elective 
care (which accounts for approximately half of all hospital admissions) in non-FT 
NHS hospitals. In 2006 PbR was applied to almost all elective, non elective and 
outpatient care (Farrar et al. 2007).
16   
 
In addition to Choose and Book and PbR, the government sought to give additional 
fiscal, clinical and managerial autonomy to NHS hospitals in order to further foster a 
competitive environment for hospitals. From April 2004 onwards high performing 
NHS hospitals could apply for Foundation Trust (FT) status. This gave hospitals 
greater financial autonomy, allowing them to keep and reinvest surpluses across 
financial years. This represents considerable freedom over financial matters as non-
FT NHS hospitals were required to break even on an annual basis and were heavily 
constrained in their access to capital.  FTs also were given easier access to (primarily) 
private sources of capital. Hospitals earned this additional autonomy by performing 
well against key performance targets, the most important of which were good 
financial performance and the reduction in waiting times for elective care.
17 
 
B.  Expected hospital responses to the reforms  
                                                 
15 The payment unit is the HRG (Healthcare Resource Group), a group of diagnoses which utilize 
similar levels of resources and are very similar to DRGs used in the US.   
16http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorganisation/Financeandplanning/NHSFinancialReforms/DH
_077259 (accessed February 27, 2010). 
17 Trusts apply to become an FT. Granting of FT status is undertaken by an independent regulator, 
Monitor, who pay particular attention to financial performance. In 2004 only 20 hospitals out of a 
population of over 270 were granted FT status. By the end of 2007 there were 83 FTs out of a 
population of around 240 NHS hospitals, with the intention that eventually all trusts will get FT status. 
http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/home/about-nhs-foundation-trusts/nhs-foundation-trust-directory 
(accessed February 27, 2010).  
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The established literature (reviewed in Gaynor 2006) suggests that an increase in the 
elasticity of demand combined with a fixed price regime should lead to an 
improvement in hospital quality where hospitals face competition, and a larger 
increase in quality where hospitals face greater competition.  The question is whether 
the incentives facing the market participants in the English NHS are such that the 
reforms have this effect. There are reasons to expect this response.   
  
First, NHS hospitals have incentives to respond to increased competition. While NHS 
hospitals are public organisations, the regime they operate under gives hospital 
managers strong incentives not to make losses. The government monitors the 
performance of hospitals on an annual basis and publishes summary assessments of 
their performance based on a range of indicators. These include measures of quality of 
care, access to care and financial performance. The weight given to financial 
performance in the summary assessments is high. Managers of hospitals which 
perform poorly in terms of the summary assessments may be replaced (and this does 
happen), while hospitals which perform well can get the greater autonomy awarded to 
Foundation Trust status. Further, hospitals with FT status can retain surpluses, and 
non-FT hospitals that perform well have the opportunity to earn FT status.    
 
Second, PbR is a very highly geared case based reimbursement system. In 2006 over 
60% of hospital income came from PbR payments (Department of Health 2007) and 
was projected to rise to closer to 90% in the following years (Street and Maynard 
2007). The effect of PbR is to tighten the annual budget constraints for hospitals and 
increase the amount of uncertainty for hospital managers. Between 1997 and 2005, 
the use of annual contracts meant that annual revenues were known at the beginning 
of the year and costs were reasonably certain. Post-PbR revenues are more uncertain, 
as hospitals are no longer guaranteed volume at the start of each year. Supply has also 
been increased, as “Choose and Book” has opened hospitals up to competition from 
outside their local catchment area. Hospitals obtain revenues from patient volume (as 
prices are fixed), and, where rivals are present, have to compete for patients based on 
quality. Hospitals facing more competitors should have to compete more intensively 




Third, Choose and Book, by providing patients with greater choice and information, 
should increase the elasticity of demand facing hospitals. While increasing choice for 
patients might have little impact where patients have to make choices unassisted, the 
program is implemented by GPs. In addition to being mandatory, these physicians 
receive financial payments for the extra costs of implementing the system. Thus they 
have no reason not to offer their patients choice, other than their professional 
judgement. And while there is some evidence that not all primary care physicians 
thought that patients were able or wanted to make choices, a survey commissioned by 
the Department of Health found that 45% of patients recalled being offered a choice 
of hospital (Department of Health 2009). In addition, Dixon et al. (2010) found that 
the most important dimensions in patient choice of hospital were primarily measures 
of quality of care, such as hospital ‘superbugs’ (acquired infection rates) and 
cleanliness. 
 
III. Empirical strategy 
 
Our goal is to test the hypothesis that the pro-competition policy improved hospital 
quality. To do this we exploit the variation in market structure across hospitals and 
examine whether quality is higher for hospitals in less concentrated markets after the 
reform than before. This is a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimating 
the effect of a policy change. The simplest DiD strategy compares two groups over 
two time periods, where a treatment group is exposed to a policy change in the second 
period and a control group is not exposed to the policy in either period. The NHS 
market based reforms do not fit neatly within this simple DiD framework, as the 
reforms apply to all hospitals in England at the same time. However, the intensity of 
the competition induced by the reforms will vary according to market structure, which 
is a function of the geographical configuration of patient location and hospital sites. In 
some places population density results in a market structure which permits a high 
degree of choice. In others, population density is low and hospitals are located in 
highly concentrated markets with few competitors. As a consequence, post-policy a 
hospital in an unconcentrated market faces more exposure to the policy change than 




We therefore identify the impact of competition from the interaction of a continuous 
treatment intensity variable (the degree of concentration) with a dummy for the post-
reform year.
18 We use data from 2003 to capture the period before the policy change 
and data from 2007 for the period after the policy change.
19 This gives the DiD 
regression specification: 
 
qit = β0 + I(t=2007) +β2I(t=2007)*HHIit + βHHIit + βXiti +it  (1)
where qit is the outcome variable, quality of care at hospital i at time t. I(.) is an 
indicator function for the post-reform period, which takes the value 1 for financial 
year 2007 and 0 otherwise. HHIit is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, our measure of 
market structure, Xit is a vector of observed hospital characteristics which vary over 
time, i is an unobserved fixed hospital effect, jt is random noise and t takes two 
values, financial year 2003 and financial year 2007. The DiD coefficient is βwhich 
measures the effect of market structure post-reform. Any common macro changes are 
picked up by the time dummy.   
 
Endogeneity is a common concern in estimating regression models like (1) with the 
HHI on the right hand side (see, e.g., Bresnahan 1989). For example, if unobservably 
sicker patients go to better hospitals, which are in urban areas (and hence less 
concentrated markets), this would result in a negative correlation between the HHI 
and (poor) quality as measured, for instance, by mortality rates. On the other hand, if 
better hospitals have higher HHIs because of their higher quality, this would result in 
a positive correlation between the HHI and mortality.   
 
Our use of a short time series minimizes changes in populations or labor markets that 
may result in demand or supply changes. The use of a fixed effects estimator controls 
for the impact of any time invariant hospital-specific factors associated with quality, 
so that the levels of the outcomes may differ freely across hospitals in the pre-policy 
world. These hospital-specific factors include location, so we control for features that 
may be spatially associated with market concentration but are related to competition. 
                                                 
18 Card (1992) was one of the first applications in economics to use a continuous treatment variable to 
estimate the impact of a policy. See also Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
19 The 2007 data are the most recent comprehensive data available. Aggregating the data into two 
periods, pre and post, is an approach recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004) to solve the problem of 
serial correlation in DiD applications.   
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In addition, we include in the Xit vector controls for observable time varying measures 
of the health of both the patients admitted to the hospital and the population in the 
catchment area of the hospital, as well as measures of local income to control for 
patient health or other effects of income on demand. 
 
However, there may remain concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. To deal with 
this, we instrument our measure of market structure with a measure of market 
structure based on factors unrelated to quality or unobserved patient heterogeneity. 
Following Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) we 
predict market structure on the basis of patient and hospital characteristics (patient 
distance from each hospital, patient demographics, patient illness severity, and size 
and teaching status of hospitals) and replace the actual HHI in (1) with a predicted 
HHI. This predicted HHI will depend only on these patient and hospital observables 
(in large part, patient distances from hospitals) and thereby eliminate possible 
correlation with the error in the quality equation.  We discuss the construction of our 





We have assembled a rich database with hospital-level panel information on a variety 
of hospital quality and access to care indicators, financial performance, patient case 
mix and local area conditions. This was compiled from a large number of 
administrative data sources that we discuss briefly here and are presented in detail in 
Appendix Table A1. We use data on the universe of inpatient discharges from every 
hospital in the NHS in England for the financial years 2003 to 2007, comprising over 
13 million admissions in around 240 hospitals per year. 
21 We focus here on a (large) 
subset of these hospitals - short term general hospitals (called acute hospitals in the 
UK). These are the dominant suppliers of hospital-based services.  
 
                                                 
20 In robustness checks (Section V.C) we estimate (1) using actual market structure.  
21 Hospitals are called “trusts” in the UK. An NHS “trust” is a financial, managerial and administrative 
unit and may cover more than one physical hospital, all of which are located closely in geographical 
space as there are no hospitals chains in the NHS. We use the term “hospital” rather than “hospital 
trust” for expositional convenience.  
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Our sample selection criteria and impacts on sample size are laid out in panel (a) of 
Table A2 in the Appendix. The population of acute hospitals falls slightly from 180 in 
2003 to 175 in 2007 (due to hospital reorganization by the government to deal with 
longer term changes in population density). Our first, and main, selection rule is to 
select hospitals with at least 5,000 total admissions. We do this to drop hospitals with 
low numbers of admissions as these hospitals will be specialist hospitals without 
emergency rooms (around 50% of patients enter hospitals via the emergency rooms). 
This eliminates 10 hospitals from the analysis in 2003 and 8 hospitals in 2007. 
Second, we drop those hospitals for which mortality data or the data necessary to 
calculate HHIs are not available for both years. Our final sample contains 162 
hospitals for each year of the analysis, totalling 324 hospital-year observations for the 
main analyses. For our analysis of AMI mortality we also exclude hospitals with 
fewer than 150 AMI admissions to avoid the problem of variability of rates from 
small denominators (see e.g., Kessler and McClellan 2000). This reduces the number 
of hospitals to 130 in 2003 and 121 in 2007, giving 251 hospital-year observations for 
the emergency AMI analyses.  
  
The fall in the number of hospitals from the pre- to the post-policy period may raise 
concerns as to whether we have a selected sample. To test whether sample exit is 
correlated with hospital market structure we examine the association between the 
probability of a hospital exiting our sample and, first, the market structure it faced in 
2003 and, second, the change in the market structure experienced by the hospital 
between 2003 and 2007. Using all acute hospitals as the initial sample, Table A2, 
panel (b), shows that exit is associated with the level of HHI in 2003. Exit is not, 
however, associated with the change in the HHI. We take from this that we have a 
sample which contains a few less hospitals in unconcentrated markets than the 
population of all acute hospitals, but that the selection made necessary by 
reconfigurations, small numbers and missing data does not create a problem for our 
DiD identification strategy, which uses changes in the HHI for identification. 
 
A.  Measures of hospital quality 
We use both mortality rates within the hospital and in all locations (i.e. including 
deaths post-hospital discharge). Both are derived from Hospital Episode Statistics  
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(HES) data, which are administrative data on every NHS health episode such as an 
operation or physician consultation. We construct yearly data at the hospital level for 
28 day in-hospital mortality rates for all admissions and for emergency AMI for 
patients aged 55 or over. Deaths following emergency admission for AMI have been 
published by both the US and UK governments as indicators of hospital quality. This 
indicator is also the most widely used measure of hospital quality in the economics 
literature for a number of reasons. 
  
First, AMI admissions are reasonably high volume and mortality is a fairly common 
outcome, so variability in the rates is less of an issue than for other treatments. 
Second, the infrastructure used to treat AMI is common to other hospital services, 
making it a good general marker of hospital quality (Gaynor 2006).
22 Third, all 
patients with a recognized AMI are admitted and, in the UK, patients are taken to 
their closest hospital, so there is little scope for selection bias to affect the decision of 
who gets admitted.  We also examine deaths following AMI admissions in all 
locations within 30 days of admission (on or after discharge). These data allow us to 
examine whether hospitals respond to competition by discharging patients in a poorer 
health state.
23 As another indicator of a hospital’s quality of care we use the all-cause 
in-hospital mortality rate, as studies have found falls in overall hospital mortality 
linked to clinical and managerial quality improvement programmes and to variability 
in hospitals’ performance across a number of conditions (Wright and Shojania 2009; 
Jha et al. 2005).
24 
                                                 
22 Many of the actions to reduce deaths from emergency admissions for AMI need to be taken soon 
after an attack, and so the performance of a hospital in terms of AMI reflects the performance of its 
A&E department (accident and emergency department, or emergency room).  
23 These data are constructed by linking information on deaths following discharge (from the UK 
Office for National Statistics, ONS) to the admitting hospital (from HES data, The NHS Information 
Centre). They are for emergency AMI admissions of patients aged 35-74. Our measure of in-hospital 
AMI deaths is for patients aged 55 and over. The in-hospital AMI death rate for the 35-74 age group in 
our sample in 2007 is 4.6%, which is comparable to but lower (as expected given the ONS-HES rate 
includes deaths in all locations, on or after discharge) than the 5.8% in the ONS-HES linked data in the 
same year. Patients aged 75 and over account for 43% of all AMI admissions in our sample, while 
patients aged 35-54 account for only 14%. Patients aged 75 and over are three times more likely to die 
than those aged 55-74. Patients aged 35-54 are four times less likely to die than those aged 55-74. This 
explains the difference between the in-hospital and all-location AMI mortality rates in Table 1.   
24 We also examine other markers of hospital quality used by governments, including the English, to 
monitor performance. These are the MRSA bacteraemia rate (per 10,000 bed days), which is a measure 
of health care associated infection, and two measures of waiting times, the proportion of attendances 
spending less than four hours in the Emergency Room (Accident and Emergency department) and the 
proportion of patients in the waiting list waiting three months or more. All measures of hospital quality 




Mortality is the most widely used measure of hospital quality. However, it is not clear 
that hospitals compete directly over mortality rates, in the sense of maximizing profits 
(or some other objective function). But we can think of mortality as an indicator of 
overall quality in the hospital. It seems unlikely that hospitals deliberately choose 
lower quality in the form of an increased probability of death. However, hospitals that 
face less competitive pressure may choose to exert less effort or supply less quality in 
ways that indirectly affect mortality. Patients who are at serious risk of death are the 
sickest and most sensitive to the quality of care. As a consequence, if the overall 
quality of care suffers when hospitals are not pushed hard by competitive pressure, 
then we would expect to see mortality rates rise.   
 
B.  Measures of hospital market structure 
We measure market structure at the hospital level in both the pre- and post-policy 
years using an HHI based on patient flows to each hospital. This results in a hospital-
specific time varying index. The HHI is built up from patient flows at neighborhood 
level and is calculated in two steps. In the first, the HHI in each geographically 
defined neighborhood in England is calculated as the sum of squared patient shares 
across all hospitals the neighborhood sends its residents to for all elective care.
25 The 
neighborhood definition we use (the MSOA) contains on average around 7,000 
persons and so is similar, or smaller, in population, to a US zip-code.
26 We allow the 
market to be the whole of England (i.e. we include all hospitals used by each MSOA 
in the calculation of patient shares). In the second step, the HHI for each hospital is 
calculated as a weighted average of the HHIs for the neighborhoods it serves, where 
the weights are the shares of the hospital’s patients that live in each neighborhood. 
Thus each hospital has its own market. Patient flows are from the information on 
                                                                                                                                            
Emergency which is negatively and significantly correlated with the other measures. The two measures 
of AMI deaths have a correlation of around 0.6. The correlation between AMI death rates and all 
causes in-hospital mortality is around 0.2. The correlations between the non mortality outcomes and the 
mortality indicators range from 0.3 - 0.4.  
25 Elective admissions make up around half of all hospital admissions and these are those subject to 
“Choose and Book”. 
26 MSOAs (Middle Layer Super Output Areas) are defined to ensure maximum within MSOA 
homogeneity of population type. In England each of the 6,780 MSOAs has a minimum population of 
5,000 residents and an average population of 7,200 residents. Data retrieved from  
http://neighborhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/Info.do?page=userguide/moreaboutareas/furtherare
as/further-areas.htm on 26/04/2010.  
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admissions and patients’ locations in the HES dataset. In what follows, we refer to 
HHIs based on actual patient flows to the hospital as actual HHIs.  
 
As noted above, there is concern in the industrial organization literature in general 
about the potential endogeneity of concentration indices when used as regressors for 
the purpose of making inference about competition. In the health care context, Kessler 
and McClellan (2000) have argued that measures of hospital competition based on 
actual patient flows are potentially endogenous in regressions with hospital quality as 
the outcome of interest, due to potential correlation with the unobserved 
characteristics of patients, hospitals or geographic markets. To avoid this problem, we 
follow Kessler and McClellan (2000) and use as our main measure of market structure 
hospital HHIs based on patient flows that are predicted using only exogenous patient 
and hospital level characteristics. To generate predicted patient flows we first estimate 
multinomial logit patient level hospital choice models and then derive the predicted 
probabilities that a given patient attends each hospital in their choice set (for details, 
see Appendix B). These predicted probabilities are used to calculate predicted HHIs 
for each hospital using the same method described above.  
 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that predicted HHIs tend to be lower than 
actual HHIs, i.e. markets are less concentrated when HHIs based on predicted 
compared to actual patient flows.
27 This suggests that patient flows are likely to be 
influenced by potentially endogenous factors - such as unobserved hospital quality - 
leading hospital markets to appear to be more concentrated than they would otherwise 
be. So the use of predicted HHIs based on exogenous hospital and patient 
characteristics means our estimates of the impact of market structure on hospital 
quality are less likely to suffer bias arising from endogeneity between hospital quality 
and actual patient flows.  
 
C.  Covariates 
We employ a large set of covariates to control for heterogeneity across hospitals.   To 
allow for differences in the health of hospitals’ patient mix (often referred to as a 
                                                 
27 The correlation coefficients between predicted and actual HHIs in our estimation sample are 0.73 and 
0.70 for the years 2003 and 2007 respectively (both statistically significant at the 1% level).   
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hospital’s “case mix”) we include three main sets of controls. First, we control for 
hospital fixed effects, which will pick up observed and unobserved non-time varying 
differences between hospitals.
28 As our panel is short this should pick up a 
considerable amount of heterogeneity. Second, we control for the health of population 
in the hospital’s catchment area by means of the all-cause time varying mortality of 
the neighborhood of the hospital.
29 Third, we control for the age-gender distribution 
of total admissions (cause-specific admissions for emergency AMI) through the 
proportions of admissions in five year age bands for men and women (36 variables). 
In the UK context this has been shown to do a good job of controlling for case mix 
(Propper and Van Reenen 2010). In robustness tests in Section V we employ 
additional controls for the severity of patients admitted to hospitals, using a 
commonly used measure of patient severity (the Charlson index), and for measures of 
overall deprivation of the local population in the hospital’s catchment area and the 
income of the area.
30 There may remain some time varying, within area, unobservable 
that affects hospital quality and is not captured by area mortality rates or the other 
observables. However, changes in this unobservable would have to be systematically 
correlated with changes in the HHI in order to bias our results.  
 
Our baseline models also control for the total number of admissions (cause-specific 
admissions for AMI mortality) to account for any effects due to hospital size, and for 
differences in staff skill mix between hospitals by including the proportions of total 
clinical staff that are doctors and qualified nurses.
31  
 
Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, and the 
within and between variation for all the variables used in our main regressions. The 
                                                 
28 We experimented with including FT status in our regressions, but it was never remotely close to 
statistical significance, so we omitted it.   
29 This is constructed from data on 353 Local Authorities (LA) and standardized for age and gender. 
The hospital-specific area standardized mortality rate is an inverse distance-weighted average of the 
figures for all LAs. Data sources for this and all other covariates are listed in the Appendix (Table A1).  
30 The Charlson index is an index of severity of illness based upon a patient’s diagnoses and 
procedures. 19 co-morbidities are constructed based on the patient’s diagnoses and procedures. These 
are aggregated using weights derived from estimates of the co-morbidities’ contribution to predicting 
mortality. The additional measures of population health are discussed in Section V.C. 
31 There is a well established relationship between hospital volume and patient outcomes (see, e.g., 
Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2005; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town 2006).  While in principle the number 
of admissions may be endogenous, the recent studies by Gaynor et al (2005) and Gowrisankaran et al 
(2006) can not reject exogeneity. Further, we estimate our models both including and excluding the 
total number of admissions (see the Appendix).        
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average hospital in our estimation sample admits just under 68,000 patients and has 
361 emergency AMI admissions a year. About 13.2% of AMI patients aged 55 and 
older die in the hospital within 28 days. 6.9% of those aged 35-74 die within 30 days 
in either the hospital or the community. 1.6% of all patients admitted die in the 
hospital within the first 28 days after admission. However, there is wide variation in 
these rates between, and within, hospitals. Around half of the variation in the AMI 
mortality rate and around 30% of the variation in the all-cause mortality rate is within 
hospitals.  
 
D.  Did the reforms result in less concentration?  
Our estimates use differences in market concentration within hospitals (as well as 
between variation) to identify the impact of the policy. Before presenting our 
estimates, we therefore examine whether the policy had an impact on levels of market 
concentration.  
 
Figure 2 presents the kernel density estimate of the distribution of the actual HHI at 
the hospital level for 2003 and 2007. The figure shows a clear leftward shift in the 
distribution of HHI levels over the time period so that in 2007 the level of 
concentration faced by hospitals had fallen at virtually all HHI levels, with the bulk of 
the change in the middle of the distribution. 
 
To show the spatial distribution of market concentration, the left hand panel of Figure 
3 plots the location of hospitals and their concentration levels in 2003, divided into 
quartiles of the actual HHI. Darker blue dots represent more concentrated markets. As 
expected, hospitals in the least concentrated markets pre-policy (those in the bottom 
quartile of the HHI distribution, light blue dots) were largely located in the more 
densely populated urban localities, particularly in the Greater London and Manchester 
areas, while hospitals in the most concentrated markets (those in the top quartile of 
the HHI distribution) tended to be located outside urban centres. However, changes in 
concentration were not confined to the cities. The second panel of Figure 3 shows that 
some hospitals located in the largest urban areas experienced the largest decrease in 
concentration (dark red dots indicate largest change, yellow indicates least change), 
but many of the hospitals which experienced the largest decrease after the  
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implementation of the pro-competition policies of the 2000s are actually located 
around, rather than in, urban areas. Large decreases in the level of concentration faced 
by hospitals have therefore occurred both in the more densely populated areas where 
the market structure was already relatively unconcentrated in the pre-policy period 
and in more rural areas where market structure was more concentrated.
32 
 
E.  Did patients respond to the reforms? 
One of the intentions of the reforms was to change the patterns of care-seeking by 
patients.
33 If the reforms were successful we would expect to see this reflected in the 
data. We examine these patterns in Table 2, which shows the change in patient care 
seeking post-reform by hospital quality, as measured by 2003 hospital mortality rates.  
We use 2003 rates as mortality is observed with a lag and to reduce the likelihood of 
simultaneous determination of mortality and patient volume. If patients became more 
responsive to quality post policy we should see better hospitals (those in the bottom 
quartile of the mortality distribution) attracting more patients relative to worse 
hospitals (those in the top quartile). That is exactly what the data show. The total 
number of patients increased overall, but better hospitals experienced a larger increase 
in patients than did worse hospitals. The distances patients travelled for care also 
increased more for better hospitals, as did the share of patients bypassing their nearest 
hospital. This provides reassurance that there is a patient response to quality and that 
it increased during the reform.   
  
F.  Test of the difference-in-differences assumptions 
Our objective is to determine whether the differences in the evolution of average 
outcomes across groups of hospitals in England are due to changes in market structure 
brought about by the pro-competition policy changes or whether they mainly reflect 
pre-existing (observable and unobservable) differences between hospitals located in 
                                                 
32 The correlation between levels of HHI in 2003 and changes in HHI between 2003-2007 is -0.09 (p-
value = 0.250) showing that changes in competition levels after the reforms occurred for hospitals in 
both more and less concentrated markets pre-policy.  
33 We note that decisions about where to seek care are likely to be the product of patient and family 
preferences and doctor advice.  The identity of the decision maker is not critical here.  What matters is 
whether decisions about where to go respond to quality.    
 
20
markets with different structures.
34 To test whether our DiD assumptions are satisfied 
we examine the bivariate relationship between the observed baseline conditions and 
the subsequent four year change in the HHI. Differences in HHI change associated 
with the baseline conditions may indicate that hospitals that differ in terms of HHI 
growth also differ in terms of unobserved factors. The bivariate associations between 
the baseline conditions, as measured by the controls used in the main analyses and in 
the robustness checks, and the subsequent change in market structure are presented in 
columns (1)-(8) of Table 3. In no cases were any of the baseline conditions 
significantly associated with the subsequent HHI change. Columns (9)-(11) present 
the bivariate associations between the initial levels of mortality and the subsequent 
changes in market structure. Again, none of these associations are significantly 




Figures 1a and 1b presented in Section I suggested that the introduction of 
competition reduced the AMI and all-cause death rates in markets where the policy 
could have more effect – for those hospitals operating in markets with lower levels of 
concentration. In this section we formally test this using equation (1) to estimate the 
effect of the policy. We begin by looking at the impact of competition on quality 
measured by our four sets of death rates. We then examine the impact of the policy on 
the volume and composition of patients treated and on simple measures of 
productivity, subject our results to a wide set of robustness checks and present 
estimates of the financial magnitude of the effects.  
                                                 
34 It is unlikely that hospitals in less concentrated markets are similar in terms of observables to 
hospitals in more concentrated markets as hospital density is positively associated with population 
density. An examination of the relationship between observables and market structure in 2003 
(available from the authors) shows hospitals in less concentrated markets had lower total admissions, 
larger shares of doctors and qualified nurses, larger retained surpluses, lower average Charlson index, 




A.  The impact of competition on quality 
Table 4 reports our DiD estimates of the impact of market structure on hospital 
quality.
35 All estimates control for the HHI and a 2007 year dummy, case mix, cause-
specific admissions, staffing and the health of the population in the hospital’s 
catchment area. Column (1) presents estimates for the in-hospital death rate after 
emergency AMI admission. Concentration has a statistically significant positive effect 
on mortality, i.e. higher market concentration (a larger HHI) leads to lower quality.
36 
A 10% increase in the HHI leads to an increase of 2.46% in the AMI death rate.
37  
 
It is possible that the in-hospital mortality rate may not adequately measure mortality 
post-admission. Some patients will die outside the hospital after being discharged.  
Further, it is possible that hospitals facing more competition may discharge patients 
sooner, with adverse health effects (the “quicker and sicker” response). We therefore 
also use AMI mortality occurring anywhere (in-hospital or community) within 30 
days after admission to address these concerns. Column (2) presents the results for the 
AMI mortality rate in any location 30 days after admission.
38 The estimates again 
show that higher market concentration significantly leads to poorer outcomes.
39 
 
                                                 
35 All dependent variables and covariates (except retained surplus where used as this may be negative) 
are in logs. To ensure that this functional form does not drive our results we estimate in levels in 
robustness tests in Table 6.  
36 In principle, one should take account of the fact that the predicted HHI is estimated in calculating the 
standard errors.  However, the predicted HHI is constructed from a patient choice model estimated on 
the population of hospital elective admissions, which number 6.5 million in 2003 and 7.8 million in 
2007.  As a consequence, there is little sampling variation to account for.  To be conservative, we 
examined this empirically. We generated ten bootstrap samples of hospital elective admissions for each 
year, estimated the patient choice model on each sample, then constructed predicted hospital HHIs (as 
described in Section IV).  The intra-hospital correlations between the bootstrapped predicted HHIs 
were 0.9977 for 2003 and 0.9999 for 2007.  This indicates that there is in fact very little sampling 
variation empirically. 
37 Full estimation results for the in-hospital AMI mortality rate are presented in Table A3 in the 
Appendix.  
38 The data linking deaths post discharge to the hospital of discharge are only available for persons 
aged 35-74.  
39 While the point estimate is about 25% higher than for in-hospital mortality the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
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Column (3) presents the DiD estimate for the all-cause mortality rate. The estimate 
again shows a significant relationship between quality and market concentration. The 
magnitude is considerably smaller than that for AMI. To test whether the estimated 
effect for all-cause mortality is driven only by AMI, column (4) presents the DiD 
estimate for all-cause in-hospital mortality excluding deaths after AMI admissions. 
The coefficient is essentially the same as when AMI deaths are included, indicating 
that there is an effect from the policy on both the AMI death rate and the death rate 
following all other admissions.
40, 41  
 
The larger effect we find when quality of care is measured by the AMI mortality rate 
rather than all-cause mortality rate is likely to be due, at least in part, to the fact that 
many conditions that result in death in the hospital are not responsive to better quality 
health care. Nolte and McKee (2008) report that "amenable mortality" - deaths from 
causes that should not occur in the presence of timely and effective health care - 
accounted for around 27% of total mortality for males aged under 75 years in the UK 
in 2002-03, and 33% for females. On the other hand, this study (and other studies 
based on systematic reviews of published clinical evidence, see Nolte and McKee 
2004 for a review) includes ischemic heart disease - and its AMI component - among 
the causes of death which are amenable to better health care, with around half of such 
premature deaths considered to be avoidable by factors such as better management of 
the condition within the hospital. Therefore, the effect of improvements in hospital 
care quality (driven by the pro-competition reforms) is likely to be larger when 
quality is measured by AMI mortality rates than when quality is measured by the 
overall death rate, as the latter includes several conditions for which mortality is less 
(or not at all) affected by health care quality. 
 
                                                 
40 It is worth reporting the DiD estimates with no controls except hospital fixed effects, as they 
represent the unconditional effect of the policy.  The DiD estimates (standard errors) for the regressions 
without controls are as follows: in-hospital AMI mortality, 0.113 (0.080), AMI mortality in any 
location, 0.204 (0.090), all-cause in-hospital mortality, 0.095 (0.028), and all-cause in-hospital 
mortality excluding AMI, 0.096 (0.028). 
41  It is worth noting that the estimates are robust to whether the number of admissions or the area 
mortality rate are included.  One might be concerned about the possible endogeneity of these measures, 
but the point estimates and their significance are virtually unchanged by excluding them.    
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In summary, we find that hospitals operating in less concentrated markets had 
significantly lower mortality rates post-reform than those in more concentrated 
markets.
42  We infer from this that the policy “worked” – it increased competition in 
less concentrated markets and the increased competitive pressure led to improvements 
in quality.    
 
Although the estimates are statistically significant, the estimated magnitude of the 
response, while not trivial, is relatively modest. A 10% fall in the HHI is associated 
with a fall in the in-hospital death rate following AMI admissions by 2.46%. This 
amounts to 1/3
rd of a percentage point at the mean AMI death rate of 13.2%. Our 
estimated magnitudes are also fairly similar to those from some other relevant studies.  
Kessler and McClellan (2000) estimate that a move from the top quartile to the 
bottom quartile of the HHI in their sample will lead to a 3.37 percentage point fall in 
the AMI death rate. The equivalent figure using our estimates and data is 3.61 
percentage points.
43 Cooper et al. (2010, p.27) find that a one standard deviation 
increase in their measure of competition for English hospitals is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point reduction in the 30 day in-hospital AMI mortality rate (per year) 
following the NHS pro-competition reforms. Our results imply a very similar 0.33 
percentage point reduction for each year post-policy (2004 to 2007).
44 We discuss the 
economic significance of these estimates at the end of this Section.   
 
                                                 
42 We also examined another measure of quality - the MRSA rate - and two access measures - the share 
of patients waiting more than three months and share of attendances spending more than four hours 
waiting for care in the emergency room (A&E department). Using the same model as presented in 
Table 4, the coefficients (standard errors) on these estimates are -0.110 (0.118), 0.078 (0.167) and -
0.005 (0.011). Thus none of these outcomes are associated with the policy change. MRSA rates are 
highly influenced by changes in behavior in the community as well as hospital policy (see e.g., Ferry 
and Etienne 2007 and references therein) and so may not respond strongly to hospital level attempts to 
reduce them. Waiting times had been the target of a major policy campaign between 2000 and 2005 
and had fallen substantially by 2005 (Propper et al. 2010), perhaps leaving relatively little scope for 
further reductions in response to the competition policy.  
43 See Appendix 3 in their paper, which presents the results for the specification in which HHI enters 
linearly. Their measure of mortality is the 1 year AMI mortality rate for US Medicare beneficiaries.  
The comparable estimated effect for our sample is derived as follows. A 43 unit decrease in HHI (=1% 
in our sample) leads to a 0.032 percentage point decrease in AMI deaths at the mean (= 0.246% 
*13.2%). So a unit decrease in HHI leads to 0.032/43 = 0.000744 percentage point decrease in AMI 
deaths. The difference in mean HHI between the top and bottom quartiles in our sample is 4,854.6. 
This equals a 3.61 percentage points (= 4854.6*0.000744) fall in the death rate.    
44 The effect in our sample is derived as follows. Using our estimated AMI coefficient, a one standard 
deviation reduction in HHI (=1,921 units, a 41% reduction) from the mean implies a 10.1% reduction 
in AMI deaths for the post-policy period, or 1.33 percentage point (our mean AMI death rate is 13.2%). 
This is equivalent to a 0.33 percentage point decrease per year in AMI mortality for the period 2004-
2007 (=1.33/4).      
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B.  The impact of competition on other aspects of performance 
We also examine whether the reform had an impact on resource use. In Table 5 we 
examine the mean length-of-stay of admitted patients (LOS), the total number and the 
mix of admissions (the shares that are elective and non-elective), expenditure and a 
simple measure of (lower) productivity, expenditure per admission.  
 
Column (1) indicates that increases in concentration are significantly associated with 
a rise in the length-of-stay. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10% fall in a 
hospital’s HHI on average is associated with a 2.5% fall in length-of-stay. At the 
mean length-of-stay in the sample of 1.2 days this is just under an hour.
45 However, 
the policy change does not seem to have affected either the total number of 
admissions or their composition (columns (2)-(4)). Nor did the policy result in any 
change in either total hospital operating expenditure or expenditure per admission.
46 
Overall, we do not find evidence that resource utilization increased in less 
concentrated markets following the reforms.  
 
Taken together, the findings for quality (Table 4) and resource utilization (Table 5) 
indicate that hospitals facing more competitive pressure were able to find ways to 
marshal resources more efficiently to produce better patient outcomes.   
 
C.  Robustness checks 
Table 6 reports a large number of robustness tests for AMI, all-cause mortality and 
length-of-stay. All cells report the DiD estimates from separate regressions using 
model (1). The first row presents the baseline results from Table 4, columns (1) and 
(3), and Table 5, column (1). 
 
Placebo tests  
If our results are being driven by pre-existing observable or unobservable differences 
between hospitals facing different levels of market concentration, we would expect to 
find significant estimates if we compared hospitals facing more and less concentrated 
                                                 
45 Farrar et al. (2007) find that the application of PbR was associated with reductions in the average 
length-of-stay ranging between 1.2%-2.3%, depending on the comparison group used..   
46 We also find no policy effect on a simple measure of labor productivity (number of admissions per 
clinical staff). The DiD coefficient (standard error) is -0.020 (0.026).   
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market structure before the reforms were introduced. To test this we undertake 
placebo DiD tests by estimating the same models as in Tables 4 and 5 using data from 
before the reforms.
47 Row 2 in Table 6 presents the results using 2001 as the placebo 
“policy-off” year and 2003 as the placebo “policy-on” year. None of the estimated 
coefficients in row 2 are even close to being statistically significant at conventional 
levels and their magnitudes are very small compared to the baseline estimates. This 
suggests that our results are driven by the reforms rather than due to pre-existing 
differences between hospitals.  
 
Estimation using only variation in pre-policy market structure  
In our model, identification comes from the within hospital change in (predicted) 
market structure. Figure 2 shows that while market concentration does change, this 
change is relatively small due to the short time period we study. We therefore 
estimate a different specification of the DiD in which we estimate the impact of the 
policy from only cross-sectional variation in exposure to the policy, where exposure is 
defined as the market structure pre-policy. The idea behind this estimator is that 
hospitals located in less concentrated markets before the policy will face more 
competitive pressure after the policy.
48 We use the predicted pre-reform HHI 
(HHI
p
i,2003) as the measure of policy exposure and estimate: 
 
qit =  + I(t=2007) +I(t=2007)*HHI
p
i,2003 + 3Xiti +it   (2)
 
The impact of market structure differs pre- and post-reform through the interaction of 
the fixed HHI
p
i,2003 with the post-reform year indicator. This approach identifies a 
change in conduct due to the reform, the key identifying assumption being that 
without the policy intervention the trend in the outcome would have been the same 
whatever the market structure. Treatment induces a deviation from this parallel trend.   
 
 
                                                 
47 A few hospitals used in our main regressions were not active before 2003 and this slightly changes 
the sample size compared to the baseline estimates.  
48 Similar ideas have been used in other contexts (Angrist and Pischke 2008), for example in evaluation 
of the employment effects of the minimum wage (Card 1992). In the health care context this approach 
was used by Propper et al. (2008) to study the 1990s NHS internal market reforms and adopted by 




Row 3 presents the DiD estimates from equation (2). It is clear that these are 
statistically significant and virtually identical to those from our preferred 




Further controls for patient heterogeneity  
In our main regressions we control for differences in case mix between hospitals with 
36 demographic variables (the shares of admissions within 5 year age-gender bands), 
the local area mortality rates and a full set of hospital dummies. This goes some way 
to alleviating the concern that our estimates are biased by different patterns of case 
severity across hospitals facing different market structure (for instance, by more 
severely ill patients systematically choosing high quality urban hospitals post-reform). 
We test the robustness of our results by including a further measure of the severity of 
patients treated in the hospital, the Charlson index. We do not use the index in our 
main regressions because of concerns that it may pick up-coding responses to the PbR 
system. However, provided up-coding post-policy is not correlated with market 
structure, the Charlson index is a good further control for case mix.
50 The results in 
row 4 of Table 6 show that the DiD coefficients change little after inclusion of this 
measure. In addition, the estimated coefficients on the Charlson index (not shown) are 
themselves never close to statistical significance.  
 
As a further test of patient heterogeneity issues, we test the sensitivity of our results to 
inclusion of controls for changes in the health of the population in the catchment area 
of the hospital.  Our main results already include a direct measure of population 
health (the age-gender standardized mortality rate of the population in the catchment 
area). We augment this with a measure of social deprivation (which includes a health 
dimension) of the patients admitted to the hospital: this is the government constructed 
                                                 
49 We also estimated equation (1) using actual HHIs rather than predicted. The coefficients are 
significant and similar for AMI deaths (coefficient = 0.256, se=0.135), but larger for all-cause mortality 
(coefficient = 0.093, se=0.043) and length-of-stay (coefficient = 0.488, se=0.091) indicating that our 
use of predicted HHIs provides more conservative estimates. 
50 DRG systems have been argued to give incentives for greater coding of patient severity in order to 
move patients into categories which have higher reimbursement (see e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986, 
Dafny 2005).    
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Index of Multiple Deprivation.
51 The results in row 5 show an increase in the 
coefficient for AMI mortality and length-of-stay and a decrease in the coefficient for 
all-cause mortality after inclusion of these controls but the results remain statistically 
significant. We conclude that our estimates are robust to these extra case mix controls, 
reducing concerns that unobserved heterogeneity in patient severity may be driving 
our results. 
 
Financial position of the hospital 
We do not control in our main models for hospitals’ financial surpluses or deficits, 
since this may be endogenous. Hospitals with higher quality may admit higher 
volumes of patients and this could result in higher surpluses, and vice versa. However, 
the switch to PbR may give hospitals a large income shock. Under PbR hospitals get a 
price per procedure equal to the average cost of all hospitals. This price may be far 
from the hospital’s own cost. As PbR payment accounted for a large proportion of 
hospital revenue, some hospitals may have experienced large income shocks (positive 
and negative) when full PbR was rolled out in 2006. Our results may be driven by this 
income shock rather than changes in market concentration. To test this, we include an 
additional control for the hospital’s financial position as measured by the end of year 
surplus/deficit. Row 6 presents the estimates including this control. The DiD point 
estimates change very slightly but remain statistically significant at conventional 
levels and we therefore conclude that the response is the result of competitive 
pressure rather than the result of any associated income shock. 
 
Weighting and functional form 
We exclude hospitals with low volumes of admissions to ensure our results are not 
driven by the variability in rates induced by low denominators. To test that our results 
are robust to this exclusion we re-estimated the model including all observations, but 
weighted our regressions by either the total number of admissions (for the all-cause 
mortality rate and length-of-stay) or the cause-specific admissions (for the AMI 
mortality rate). Row 7 presents these estimates. The coefficients for all-cause 
mortality and length-of-stay are virtually unchanged, while that for AMI falls by 
                                                 
51 The Index of Multiple Deprivation is an average of the rankings for the patients’ local areas of 
residence (where ranking=1 for the most deprived area in the year). The overall index is constructed as 




around 45% but remains statistically significant. The results suggest that hospitals 
with small volumes of AMI admissions are different from those with higher volumes, 
but we still find a statistically significant effect.  
 
In row 8 we test the robustness of our results to our functional form assumptions and 
estimate the models with both the dependent variable and HHI in levels instead of 
logs. We report the implied elasticity estimates from this specification to enable 
comparison with the baseline results. The table shows that our results are robust to 
estimation in levels. The estimates are statistically significant, are somewhat lower 
than the log specification for AMI and length-of-stay but are almost identical for all-
cause mortality. As a further robustness check of our functional form assumptions, we 
investigated the policy effects at quartiles of the HHI distribution. A DiD 
specification using an indicator for whether the hospital is in the top quartile of the 
HHI distribution rather than the continuous variable shows that hospitals operating in 
more concentrated markets post-policy had higher death rates and length-of-stay than 
their counterparts in less concentrated markets.
52  
 
Local area economic conditions 
Between 2003 and 2007 areas with higher and lower hospital concentration may have 
experienced different economic growth rates. Recent research has suggested that 
economic growth can adversely affect AMI outcomes, with a greater number of heart 
attacks being observed during upturns in the business cycle (Ruhm 2006). It could 
therefore be argued that the impact of market concentration that we find is not due to 
the result of poor hospital quality, but to smaller falls in fatalities due to higher rates 
of economic growth in more concentrated markets. To ensure our results are not 
driven by differential business cycle effects we add a control for a time varying 
measure of economic activity at the level of the hospital’s catchment area. This is the 
average male full-time wage.
53 Row 9 presents the results and shows that our DiD 
                                                 
52 The coefficients (standard errors) on the top quartile of HHI are 0.137 (0.061) for the AMI death 
rate, 0.074 (0.024) for all-cause mortality, and 0.103 (0.062) for length-of-stay. 
53 Male full-time wage is the average of the median full-time gross wages for male workers (all 
occupations) in the local area districts within a radius of 30 kilometers from the hospital. In the context 
of our study, area male wages do not serve exclusively as a proxy for changes in local income. Since 
male wages are highly correlated with female wages, controlling for the former should also account for 
the impacts of local wages on hospital staff quality that in turn affects health outcomes, as discussed in 
Propper and Van Reenen (2010).  
 
29
effect of market concentration remains virtually unchanged for the AMI death rate 
(and the  two other hospital outcomes).  
 
In addition to the potential effect of the economic cycle on health status, economic 
growth might also directly affect hospital emergency outcomes. This is particularly 
relevant for deaths following AMI admissions. Stronger economic activity is likely to 
generate increased traffic flows and road congestion, thus potentially increasing the 
time elapsed between the heart attack and hospital arrival (“floor to door” time ), so 
decreasing the chances of patient survival. To address this we add a control for 
ambulance speeds to our estimates for AMI. The government monitors the proportion 
of urgent and life-threatening ambulance calls which arrive at the scene of the 
incident within eight minutes and we use this independent assessment. The results in 
row 10 show that our market concentration impacts on AMI mortality are robust to 
this additional control.
54 These tests provide reassurance that our market 
concentration effects are not attributable to differential economic growth rates across 
localities.    
 
Overall, we conclude our results for the impact of the reforms are robust to a wide 
range of checks. 
 
D.  Did the policy matter? 
To provide a better sense of the economic significance of the reforms we undertake 
some simple back of the envelope calculations. The first is to calculate the benefits in 
monetary terms from the observed change in market structure following the reforms. 
We calculate the value of the gain in life years that would arise from a change in the 
HHI equal to the observed (average) decrease in HHI between 2003 and 2007 (this 
equals 118). Using the estimated coefficient from Table 4, column (3), the average 
hospital would experience a 0.2% fall in its overall mortality rate from this decrease 
                                                 
54 We also find a strongly significant DiD estimate using AMI mortality rate on or after discharge 
(coefficient (standard error) = 0.400 (0.140)). The corresponding estimates for all-cause mortality are 
0.058 (0.035), significant at 10%. Due to missing data on ambulance response times for some hospitals, 
our sample size is slightly reduced for this robustness test (233 observations compared with 250 in the 
baseline in-hospital AMI model, and 305 compared to 323 for all-cause mortality). Our baseline results 
of the effect of market concentration on in-hospital AMI death rates are almost unchanged if we 
estimate the model using the same sample used for the ambulance response robustness check: the 
estimated DiD coefficient (standard error) is 0.249 (0.099). For all-cause deaths, the corresponding 




55 The average age of death of patients in hospital is 77 years. A 77 year 
old male in Britain has an additional life expectancy of 9.5 years and a female has an 
additional life expectancy of 11 years. Using our estimate that 0.2% percent of these 
deaths are averted and combining it with these extra years of life leads to an estimated 
3,354 life years saved.
56 If we adopt the $100,000 benchmark of Cutler and McClellan 
(2001) for the value of a year of life, the beneficial effects of the pro-competition 
reforms are on the order of $335.4 million, or approximately £227 million.
57  
 
This calculation gives the average benefit associated with the policy change. A second 
calculation is derive the cost of being in a concentrated compared to an 
unconcentrated market. We therefore compare the difference in life years saved for a 
hospital located in a market at the average concentration versus one with low 
concentration, defining low concentration to be an HHI one standard deviation below 
the mean. This is a difference in HHI of just under 2,000. Using the estimated 
coefficient from Table 4, column (3), a hospital in the lower HHI market would have 
3.1% fewer deaths per year. Using the same methods and numbers as above this 




As a basis for comparison, the annual NHS budget is of the order of £100 billion. The 
estimate of the immediate impact of the policy (£227 million) is approximately 2-
10ths of one percent of the NHS budget. While this is small, it is not trivial, as it 
represents the short run impact of the policy immediately after implementation and we 
                                                 
55 A one percentage change in HHI is equal to 43.5 units, so a fall of 118 would lead to a change of 
0.069*118/43.5 = 0.2%.   
56 The calculations of lives saved were made separately for each hospital and then aggregated up, 
weighting by the hospital’s number of admissions in 2007. The average age of death of 77 years is a 
weighted average for our sample of hospitals using as weights the observed death rates within six age 
bands (under 15, 15-34, 35-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75+). Male and female life expectancy is from 
“Interim Life Tables, England, 2006-2008”, Office for National Statistics.     
57 A US dollar exchanged for a pound sterling at a rate of 0.676 on May 7, 2010 (http//:www.xe.com). 
58 We find no change in either operating expenditure or operating expenditure per admission following 
the implementation of the policy. So these life year gains did not increase the cost paid by the tax 
payer. However, the policy did lead to a fall in length-of-stay, which should have reduced costs. A 
conservative assumption is that the cost of achieving the extra quality is equal to the value of the 
reduction in length-of-stay. Using the coefficient from Table 5, column (1), and assuming a cost per 
day in hospital of £250 (based on personal communication with the UK Department of Health), this 
gives values of £24 million ($35.5 million) for the average change in HHI 2003-2007, and £0.4 billion 
($0.6 billion) for the difference between the mean HHI and one standard deviation below the mean for 
the value of the reduction in length-of-stay. In both cases this is considerably less than the value of the 
lives saved.   
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only enumerate the gains in quality arising from decreases in death rates and not any 
other aspects of quality that are important, but not readily measured (e.g., quality of 
life).  
 
It is possible that we are recovering short run effects of the policy, since we only have 
one year of data following implementation.  If so, the long run effects could be larger 
once hospitals and patients adjust fully to the new system. In addition, the estimate of 
the gains from a change in market structure from high to low concentration (£3.7 
billion) are substantially greater than the short run effects. This suggests that there 
could be large positive effects of policies that result in substantial decreases in 
concentration.
59   
 
VI.   Summary and conclusions 
 
We have examined the impact of the introduction of a pro-competition policy on 
hospital outcomes in England. Our results constitute some of the first evidence on the 
impacts of a market-based reform in the health care sector. We find strong evidence 
that under a regulated price regime that hospitals engage in quality competition and 
that the 2006 NHS reforms were successful. Within two years of implementation the 
NHS reforms resulted in significant improvements in mortality and reductions in 
length-of-stay without changes in total expenditure or increases in expenditure per 
patient. Our back of the envelope estimates suggest that the immediate net benefit of 
this policy is around £227 million. While this is small compared to the annual cost of 
the NHS of £100 billion, we have only calculated the value from decreases in death 
rates. Allowing for improvements in other less well measured aspects of quality will 
increase the benefit, as will any further falls in market concentration which may occur 
as the policy continues in operation. If the UK were to pursue policies that lead to de-
concentration of hospital markets, the gains could be substantially larger.   
 
                                                 
59 This does not mean that quality was optimal following the reform. Further, this is not a precise 
welfare calculation, merely a simple illustrative exercise.    
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These results suggest that competition is an important mechanism for enhancing the 
quality of care patients receive. Monopoly power is directly harmful to patients, in the 
worst way possible - it substantially increases their risk of death. The adoption of pro-
market policies in European countries, as well as policies directed at increasing or 
maintaining competition such as antitrust enforcement, appear to have an important 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable   Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum  Observations 
Death rates             
28 day AMI mortality rate  overall  13.2  3.7  4.1  26.6  N = 251 
(in-hospital, ages 55+, %)  between    3.1  7.4  23.4  n = 133 
 within    2.4  6.1  20.3   
30 day AMI mortality rate  overall  6.9  2.6  1.8  22.8  N = 251 
(on or after discharge, ages 35-74, %)  between    2.4  3.3  22.8  n = 133 
 within    1.6  0.8  13.1   
28 day all-cause mortality rate  overall  1.6  0.6  0.0  3.3  N = 324 
(in-hospital, all ages, %)  between    0.5  0.1  2.7  n = 162 
 within    0.2  1.0  2.2   
28 day all-cause mortality rate  overall  1.6  0.6  0.0  3.2  N = 324 
(in-hospital, excluding AMI, %)  between    0.5  0.1  2.7  n = 162 
 within    0.2  1.0  2.1   
Market concentration            
Herfindahl-Hirschman index,  overall  5,543  1,410  2,674  9,050  N = 324 
(actual patient flows)  between 1,395 2,742 8,896  n = 162
 within    221  4,663  6,423   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index,  overall  4,308  1,931  1,878  9,550  N = 324 
(predicted patient flows)  between    1,929  1,966  9,548  n = 162 
 within    139  3,218  5,398   
Admissions and length of stay            
Total admissions  overall  67,896  35,929  8,792  206,633  N = 324 
  between 35,331 9,079 201,744  n = 162
 within    6,817  25,471  110,321   
Total AMI admissions  overall  361  169  150  1,066  N = 251 
 (ages 55+)  between    154  150  973  n = 133 
 within    69  149  573   
Mean length-of-stay  overall  1.2 0.8 0.3 7.1  N = 324
(days)  between    0.8  0.5  6.8  n = 162 
 within    0.3  0.1  2.2   
Elective admissions  overall  52.4  12.2  24.4  98.4  N = 324 
(% of total)  between    12.0  26.7  98.2  n = 162 
 within    2.3  42.6  62.2   
Non-elective admissions  overall  47.6  12.2  1.6  75.6  N = 324 
(% of total)  between    12.0  1.8  73.3  n = 162 
 within    2.3  37.8  57.4   
Staffing and finances            
Doctors  overall  13.5  2.2  8.0  20.1  N = 323 
( % of total clinical staff)  between    1.8  8.4  18.3  n = 162 
 within    1.2  10.5  16.5   
Qualified clinical staff  overall  53.2  3.8  42.2  68.3  N = 323 
( % of total clinical staff)  between    3.6  45.0  65.1  n = 162 
 within    1.3  49.3  57.1   
Retained surplus   overall  0.2 6.5 -40.3 56.0  N = 303
(£1,000)  between    4.7  -22.2  28.0  n = 162 
 within    4.3  -27.7  28.2   
Operating expenditure   overall  197,082  125,368  18,881  766,137  N = 319 
(£1,000)  between    120,012  37,764  691,830  n = 162 
 within    35,841  85,736  308,428   
Total expenditure per admission  overall  3.0  1.3  0.2  9.9  N = 319 
(£1,000)  between    1.2  1.1  9.4  n = 162 






Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
Variable   Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Area health, case mix and economic conditions            
Standardized mortality rate  overall  100.0  10.0  77.6  129.5  N = 324 
(per 100,000, normalized)  between    8.4  83.5  123.0  n = 162 
 within    5.4  91.5  108.5   
Charlson index  overall  0.48  0.23  0.03  1.85  N = 324 
(average for all admissions)  between    0.22  0.04  1.83  n = 162 
 within 0.05 0.28 0.69 
Index of Multiple Deprivation  overall  15,411  4,940  3,849  26,985  N = 324 
(average over patients’ rankings)  between    4,929  3,902  26,676  n = 162 
 within    423  14,120  16,701   
Male full time wage in area  overall  24,955  3,774  18,985  34,551  N = 320 
(£)  between    3,391  19,691  32,362  n = 160 
 within    1,668  22,111  27,799   
Urgent ambulance calls responded within eight  overall  76.4  3.3  55.7  86.6  N = 306 
minutes (%)  between    2.6  63.9  83.8  n = 162 
 within    2.0  68.1  84.6   
Notes: Summary statistics refer to fiscal years 2003 and 2007. N = Total number of observations for the whole sample; n = Total 
number of hospitals in the sample. The samples for the AMI mortality rates include only hospitals with at least 150 AMI admissions. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices computed using all elective services. Staffing variables refer to shares of whole time equivalent 
clinical staff. Age-gender area standardized mortality rate (SMR, normalized) is an inverse distance weighted average rate specific to 
the hospital. Index of Multiple Deprivation is an average of the rankings for the patients’ local areas of residence (where ranking=1 
for the most deprived area in the year). Male full time wage is the average of the median full-time gross wages for male workers (all 
occupations) in the local area districts within a radius of 30 kilometers from the hospital. Average Charlson index for admissions at 
the hospital. Share of urgent and life-threatening (category A) ambulance calls receiving an emergency response at the scene of the 
incident within eight minutes. We also use, as measures of case mix, 36 variables corresponding to shares of cause-specific 




Table 2: Descriptive Changes in Patient Care Seeking by Hospital Mortality Rate 
 
  AMI mortality rate (2003) 
  Bottom quartile    Top quartile 
 2003  2007 
% change 
(2003-07)   2003  2007 
% change 
(2003-07) 
Number of elective 
admissions 
33,985 38,274 12.6%    41,398 45,132  9.0% 
Average distance travelled by 
patients 
11.4 11.7 2.4%    10.0 10.1 1.1% 
Share of patients bypassing 
nearest hospital 
0.37 0.39 5.4%    0.45 0.43  -4.4% 
Number  of  hospitals  33 33      32 32   
Notes: Time period is years 2003 and 2007. Elective admissions only. In-hospital 28 day AMI mortality rate (ages 55+) measured in 
2003 for hospitals with at least 150 AMI admissions. Sample means of variables in the rows for quartiles of AMI mortality (bottom 





Table 3: Tests of association between changes in HHI and baseline covariates and outcomes 
 
















mortality rate  Case mix
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
(average for 










30 day AMI 
mortality rate 
(on or after 
discharge,  
ages 35-74) 
28 day  
all-cause  
mortality rate  
(in-hospital) 
Coefficient -0.624  -0.051  5.329  -10.233  -1.695    -0.001  81.732  -1.080  -1.808  47.847 
 (0.642)  (0.086)  (8.792)  (7.947) (1.936)    (0.003)  (72.197)  (4.751)  (6.623)  (42.840) 
P-value for Wald test            0.129           
Observations 162  151  161  161  162  162  162 162  130  130  162 
Notes: Time period is years 2003 and 2007. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for all elective services calculated using predicted patient flows. The coefficients reported are from separate 
OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the change in the hospital’s HHI between 2007-03 and the regressor is the variable in the column measured in year 2003 (with a constant and 
no other regressors). Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Column (1) is total admissions in 1,000s. Columns (3)-(4) are shares of whole 
time equivalent clinical staff. Column (5) is the area age-gender standardized mortality rate, an inverse distance-weighted average rate specific to the hospital (normalized with mean 100 and 
standard deviation 10). The case mix in column (6) reports the p-value for the joint Wald test of significance of 36 variables corresponding to shares of cause-specific admissions within 5 year 
age-gender bands. The Index of Multiple deprivation in column (7) is the average for the patients’ areas of residence, where rank = 1 is least deprived. The estimation samples for the AMI 





Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of market structure on outcomes 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable 




30 day AMI 
mortality rate 
(on or after discharge,
ages 35-74) 








DiD coefficient  0.246***  0.313***  0.069**  0.066** 
  (0.084) (0.116) (0.027) (0.028) 
Case mix controls (36) (p-value)  0.007 0.106 0.000  0.000
Cause-specific admissions (p-value)  0.008  0.079  0.001  0.001 
Staff controls (p-value)  0.020  0.125  0.091  0.084 
Area SMR (p-value)  0.709 0.593 0.045  0.049
Adjusted  R-squared  0.502 0.503 0.980 0.979 
Number  of  hospitals  133 133 162 162 
Observations  250 250 323 323 
Notes: Time period is 2003 and 2007.  Models estimated by OLS with standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. HHI is for all elective services calculated using predicted patient flows. In addition to HHI in the 
respective year and the year 2007 dummy, controls are 36 case mix variables corresponding to shares of cause-specific admissions 
within 5 year age-gender bands, number of cause-specific admissions, doctors and qualified clinical staff as shares of whole time 
equivalent clinical staff (staff controls), and the area age-gender standardized mortality rate (SMR, an inverse distance-weighted 
average rate specific to the hospital). Dependent and independent variables (except case mix) are in logs. All models also include 
a constant and a full set of hospital dummies. The estimation samples for the AMI mortality rates include only hospitals with at 
least 150 AMI admissions. P-values refer to two-tailed t-tests of significance of the corresponding variable or joint Wald tests of 




Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of market structure on length-of-stay, 
admissions and expenditure 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
  Length-of-stay and admissions  Expenditure and spending per admission



















DiD coefficient  0.254***  -0.012  -0.005 -0.001 0.007  0.014
 (0.059)  (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.072)  (0.074) 
Hospitals 162  162  162  162  162  162 
Observations 323  324  324  324  319  319 
Notes: Time period is 2003 and 2007. Models estimated by OLS with standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. HHI is for all elective services calculated using predicted patient flows. In addition to HHI in the 
respective year and the year 2007 dummy, controls are 36 case mix variables corresponding to shares of cause-specific admissions 
within 5 year age-gender bands and the area age-gender standardized mortality rate (SMR, an inverse distance-weighted average 
rate specific to the hospital). Dependent and independent variables (except case mix) are in logs. For mean length-of-stay we also 
control for number of admissions and doctors and qualified clinical staff as shares of whole time equivalent clinical staff. 
Expenditure in columns (5)-(6) excludes capital expenditure. All models also include a constant and a full set of hospital 
dummies. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6: Robustness tests: main coefficients from difference-in-differences models 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  28 day AMI  
mortality rate  
(in-hospital, ages 55+) 
28 day all-cause 




(days)   Robustness test 
1. Baseline  0.246***  0.069**  0.254*** 
 (0.084)  (0.027) (0.059) 
Observations  250 323 323 
2. Placebo DiD test for 2001-2003  -0.047  0.005  -0.036 
 (0.077)  (0.027) (0.047) 
Observations  250 309 309 
3. Using time invariant pre-reform HHI level (2003)   0.216*** 0.066**  0.245***
    as market structure measure (0.079)  (0.028) (0.059) 
Observations  250 323 323 
4. Controlling for the Charlson index  0.246***  0.067**  0.239*** 
 (0.084)  (0.027) (0.060) 
Observations  250 323 323 
5. Controlling for the Index of Multiple Deprivation  0.278***  0.067**  0.263*** 
 (0.085)  (0.029) (0.061) 
Observations  250 323 323 
6. Controlling for surpluses/deficits  0.242**  0.076**  0.229*** 
 (0.093)  (0.030) (0.066) 
Observations 236 302 302
7. All hospitals (weighted by number of admissions)  0.138**  0.069***  0.261*** 
 (0.069)  (0.024) (0.061) 
Observations  299 323 323 
8. Using levels of the dependent variable and HHI  0.170**  0.069***  0.197*** 
    (implied elasticity)       
Observations  250 323 323 
9. Controlling for income (male wage in area)   0.247***  0.061**  0.258*** 
 (0.086) (0.029)  (0.062)
Observations  248 319 319 
10. Controlling for the share of urgent ambulance calls   0.238**     
      responded within eight minutes   (0.100)     
Observations 233     
Notes: Models estimated by OLS with standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
Time period is years 2003 and 2007, except for the placebo DiD models in test 2 (2001 and 2003). HHI for all elective services 
calculated using predicted patient flows. Controls are year 2007 dummy (or year 2003 dummy in test 2), 36 case mix variables 
corresponding to shares of cause-specific admissions within 5 year age-gender bands, number of cause-specific admissions, 
doctors and qualified clinical staff as shares of whole time equivalent clinical staff, and the area age-gender standardized mortality 
rate (SMR, an inverse distance-weighted average rate specific to the hospital) normalized with mean 100 and standard deviation 
10. In row 2 the dependent variable in column (1) is the AMI mortality rate at any point during a hospital stay for all ages, and the 
dependent variable in column (2) is the all-cause in-hospital mortality rate at any point during a hospital stay. Row 3 uses the time 
invariant HHI at the hospital level in 2003 (HHI
p
i,2003). Row 4 adds the average Charlson index for admissions to the hospital as a 
control. Row 5 adds the Index of Multiple Deprivation ranking for the patients’ areas of residence (average over patients’ 
rankings, where ranking = 1 for the most deprived area in the year). Row 6 adds the hospital retained surplus or deficit as a 
control. In row 7 regressions are weighted by AMI admissions (column (1)) or total admissions (columns (2) and (3)), and use all 
hospitals regardless of the number of AMI admissions (full sample). Row 8 displays the elasticity implied by the estimated 
coefficient (calculated at mean values) and its significance level. Row 9 adds as a control the average of the median full-time 
gross wages for male workers (all occupations) in the local area districts within a radius of 30 kilometers from the hospital. Row 
10 adds to the AMI mortality model in column (1) the share of category A ambulance calls (defined as urgent and life-threatening) 
receiving an emergency response at the scene of the incident within eight minutes. In all rows except 8 the dependent and 
independent variables (except age-gender controls and surplus) are in logs. All models also include a constant and a full set of 
hospital dummies. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Figure 1a: AMI mortality vs. market structure pre- and post-reform 
 
 
Figure 1b: All-cause mortality vs. market structure pre- and post-reform 
 
Notes: Each point in the figure represents a hospital. HHI is for all elective services calculated 
using actual patient flows. AMI mortality rate is in-hospital deaths within 28 days of 
emergency admission for over 55 year olds. The line is the prediction from a locally weighted 
regression of the mortality rate adjusted for case mix (using the shares of admissions within 5 
year age-gender bands) on HHI.  
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Table A1: Data sources 
 
Variable Source 
28 day AMI mortality rate (in-hospital, ages 55+)  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
30 day AMI mortality rate (on or after discharge, ages 35-74)  Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Hospital Episode 
Statistics (HES) 
28 day all-cause mortality rate (in-hospital, all ages)  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
28 day all-cause mortality rate excluding AMI (in-hospital, all 
ages) 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
MRSA bacteraemia rate  Health Protection Agency 
Patients waiting 3 months or more  Department of Health: Performance Data and Statistics 
Attendances spending less than 4 hours in A&E   Department of Health: Performance Data and Statistics 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (all elective services)  Authors’ own calculations using admissions data from Hospital 
Episode Statistics (HES) 
Total, elective and non-elective admissions  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
Total AMI admissions (ages 55+)  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
Mean length-of-stay  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
Clinical staff (whole time equivalents)  NHS Information Centre; Department of Health: NHS and 
Social Services Workforce Statistics 
Retained surplus or deficit  Department of Health: Trust financial returns; Published 
Income and Expenditure Accounts for Foundation Trusts 
Operating expenditure  Department of Health: Trust financial returns; Published 
Income and Expenditure Accounts for Foundation Trusts 
Age-gender distribution of admissions within 5 year age-gender 
bands  
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
Age-gender standardized mortality rate at the local authority 
level 
NHS: National Centre for Health Outcomes Development 
(NCHOD) 
Charlson index  Authors’ own calculations based on data from Hospital Episode 
Statistics (HES) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (average over patients’ rankings)  Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
Full time male wages at the local authority level  Office for National Statistics: Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE) 
Urgent and life-threatening (category A) ambulance calls 
responded within eight minutes 






Table A2: Sample selection and exit probabilities 
 
(a) Sample selection 
  




Hospitals with  
at least 5,000  
total admissions 
Hospitals with  
non-missing HHI  
and mortality data 
Hospitals with at least 
150 AMI admissions per 
year  
2003  180 170 162 130 
2007  175 167 162 121 
Notes: The table reports the number of hospitals in our sample in each year (2003 and 2007) under different restrictions on the set of all English 
NHS hospitals. Each column puts a further restriction on the sample compared to the column before it, so column (4) is a strict sub-sample of (3) 
and so on. Column (1) presents the total number of active acute hospitals in each year. Column (2) refers to the number of hospitals with at least 
5,000 admissions in each year. Column (3) reports the number of hospitals for which the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) concentration indices 
could be calculated, and for which mortality data (all causes) were available. Thus column (3) corresponds to the full sample used in our main 
difference-in-differences model estimations. Column (4) presents the sub-sample used in the AMI mortality rate regression models.  
 
(b) Exit probabilities: Marginal effects of the level of HHI and changes in HHI on the probability of exiting the sample 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable 
Level of HHI  
in 2003/04 
Change in HHI  
between  
2003/04-2007/08 
Indicator for leaving the final estimating sample  -0.105***  -0.003 
 (0.038)  (0.015) 
Number of hospitals  175  167 
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of probit estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to unity if the hospital is in our 
estimation sample (column (3) in panel (a) above). The sample is the set of all active acute hospitals (column (1) in panel (a)) in 2003. Standard 
errors (in parentheses under marginal effects) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The regressors are the log of the hospital’s Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) for all elective services in 2003 (column (1)), and the change in the HHI (in 1,000s) calculated as the difference between 
HHI levels for the hospital in 2007 and 2003 (column (2)). Market structure measured by the HHI based on predicted patient flows as this is the 





Table A3: Full difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of market structure on the 28 day 
AMI mortality rate (in-hospital, ages 55+) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DiD coefficient  0.113  0.160*  0.196**  0.240***  0.246*** 
 (0.080) (0.087) (0.079) (0.082)  (0.084)
Year 2007  -1.220*  -1.724**  -2.081*** -2.547*** -2.648*** 
 (0.688)  (0.746)  (0.673) (0.720) (0.778) 
HHI -0.425 -0.610 -0.721 -1.036**  -1.051**
 (0.404)  (0.464)  (0.440) (0.474) (0.484) 
AMI admissions      -0.367*** -0.342*** -0.342*** 
  (0.124) (0.126) (0.126)
Doctors (share of clinical staff)        0.467  0.468 
      (0.343)  (0.345) 
Qualified clinical staff  (share of clinical staff)  1.562**  1.568**
      (0.615)  (0.617) 
Area standardized mortality rate (SMR)          -0.472 
       (1.261) 
Case mix controls (36) (p-value)    0.014  0.015  0.006  0.007 
AMI admissions (p-value)      0.004  0.008  0.008 
Staff controls (p-value)        0.020  0.020 
Area  SMR  (p-value)       0.709 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.391 0.432 0.482 0.507 0.502 
Number  of  hospitals  133 133 133 133 133 
Observations  251 251 251 250 250 
Notes: Time period is years 2003 and 2007. Coefficients are for difference-in-differences (DiD) models estimated by OLS with 
standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The AMI mortality rate refers to in-
hospital deaths within 28 days of emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction for over 55 year olds. Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) for all elective services calculated using predicted patient flows. In addition to HHI in the respective year 
and the year 2007 dummy, the controls are 36 case mix variables corresponding to shares of AMI admissions within 5 year age-
gender bands, the total number of AMI admissions (ages 55+), doctors and qualified clinical staff as shares of whole time 
equivalent clinical staff (staff controls), and the area age-gender standardized mortality rate (SMR, an inverse distance-weighted 
average rate specific to the hospital) normalized with mean 100 and standard deviation 10. Dependent and independent variables 
(except case mix) are in logs. All models also include a constant and a full set of hospital dummies. The estimation sample 
includes only hospitals with at least 150 AMI admissions. P-values refer to two-tailed t-tests of significance of the corresponding 
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Appendix B: Estimation of predicted HHIs  
 
Assigning hospital market competitiveness based on which hospital patients actually 
attended - rather than, for example, their area of residence - can induce a correlation 
between competitiveness and unobservable determinants of outcomes, because 
patients’ hospital of admission may depend on unobserved determinants of their 
hospital’s quality and their own health status. We therefore follow Kessler and 
McClellan (2000) and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) in assigning a level of market 
competition to a hospital based on predicted patient flows from neighborhoods to 
hospitals. Hospitals are assigned the predicted level of market competition based on 
the neighborhoods from which they draw their patients.  
 
To do this, we estimate a logit model for patient choice. Having estimated these 
models, predicted HHIs at the hospital level are then computed as functions of the 
patient level predicted probabilities. First, neighborhood level predicted HHIs are 
computed as the sum of squared (predicted) shares of patients from the neighborhood 
attending each hospital and second, the hospital level predicted HHI is calculated as a 
weighted average across these neighborhood HHIs, where the weights are the 
predicted proportions of the hospital’s patients from each neighborhood. The 
neighborhood is defined as an MSOA (middle layer super output area).
60 
 
The details are as follows. 
 
Estimated HHIs 













































Following Kessler and McClellan (2000) we compute the predicted HHI for 
hospital j as the weighted average across neighborhood level predicted HHIs where 
the weights equal the predicted proportions of patients from hospital j that live in 
neighborhood k . 
                                                 
60 There are approximately 7,000 MSOAs in England each containing approximately 7,200 people, so 
they are similar in size if not a little smaller than a US zipcode. MSOAs are constructed to have 
maximum within MSOA homogeneity of population characteristics.   51
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The predicted HHI for neighborhood k  is the sum of the squared shares of patients 
from neighborhood k  who attend each hospital j .
61   
 
Specification of the utility function 
We estimate alternative specific conditional logit models using the following 
specification of the patient utility function: 
 
 
      














hh h hh h
ij ij j ij j ij ij
h
hh h hh h









Ud d z d d z
dd z dd z
female z
young z old z e











     
     
 
       









j z  is a binary indicator of whether hospital  j  is a teaching hospital, 
2
j z  is a 
binary indicator of whether hospital  j  is a big hospital (defined as being in the top 
50% of the distribution of admissions),  ij d  is the distance from the geographic centre 
of the neighborhood (the MSOA) for patient i to the geographic centre of the 
neighborhood (the MSOA) for hospital  j , 
h
ij ij dd    is the additional distance from 
patient  i to the alternative under examination j  over and above the distance to the 
nearest alternative  j

 which is a good substitute in terms of hospital characteristic h, 
i female  indicates gender,  i young  and  i old  are binary indicators of whether patient i 
is below 60 years old or above 75 years old respectively, and  i lowseverity  and 
i highseverity  are binary indicators of whether patient i has one ICD diagnosis or 
                                                 
61 The predicted HHI for hospital j can be calculated in different ways. Gowrisankaran and Town 
(2003) compute the predicted HHI for hospital j as the weighted average across patient level predicted 
HHIs where the weights are equal to the predicted probability that they attend hospital j, 
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  .  
When each patient lives in their own neighborhood, our approach will give the same predicted hospital 
level HHIs as Gowrisankaran and Town (2003). However, the larger the geographic scale of the 
neighborhoods, the more the HHIs based on this approach will differ from those based on the 
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) approach.   52
three or more ICD diagnosis respectively. All patient level variables are interacted 
with the variables 
1





Following Kessler and McClellan (2000), no individual or hospital level variables are 
entered as main effects and as Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Gowrisankaran and 
Town (2003), we explicitly omit hospital level fixed effects to prevent predicted 
choice being based on unobserved attributes of quality. The error term,  ij e , is assumed 




The model is estimated for years 2003 and 2007, and undertaken separately for each 
of the nine Government Office Regions of England, thus allowing parameter 




The sample of admissions is all elective admissions. 
 
Sample of hospitals  
We restrict our analysis to those hospitals which have 50 or more elective admissions. 





We restrict the distance travelled to be 100km, subject to ensuring that each patient’s 
choice set includes the hospital actually attended and the first and second nearest 
hospital with each binary characteristic switched on and off.  
 
To see why choice of both the first and second hospital is included, the following 
alternatives are included in all patients’ choice sets, irrespective of distance: the 
hospital actually chosen, the nearest non teaching hospital (
1 0 z  ), the nearest 
teaching hospital (
1 1 z  ), the nearest small hospital (
2 0 z  ) and the nearest big 
hospital (
2 1 z  ). 
 
                                                 
62 For example, consider the teaching hospital dimension  1 h   and suppose that the hospital under 
examination is a non-teaching hospital 
1 0 j z  , then the differential distance 
1
ij ij dd    is the distance 
to the hospital under examination over and above the distance to the nearest hospital which is also a 
non-teaching hospital. 
63 To make the model computation more efficient, we collapse patients who are identical in terms of 
model characteristics (i.e. who live in the same MSOA and go to the same hospital and have the same 
patient level characteristics) into groups. All patients within the group have the same choice set. 
Similarly, all patients within the group also have the same distances to each hospital within the choice 
set as distances are measured from MSOA centroids to hospital locations. Frequency weights are used 
in the estimation to reflect the number of patients within each group.  
64 It is possible for some alternatives within patients’ choice sets to be never chosen. This is likely to 
happen since hospitals located outside the region under investigation will be included in the choice set 
of those patients living close to the boundary, even if no patients from the region under investigation go 
to that hospital. These faraway hospitals should not cause any problems with the statistical 
identification of the model parameters. This is because, unlike standard alternative-specific conditional 
logit models, our model does not include any hospital-specific intercepts.    53
If the hospital under examination is, for example, the nearest hospital for which 
1 0 z  , then the nearest alternative which is a good substitute will actually be the 
second nearest hospital where 
1 0 z   and so the differential distance is negative. To 
compute the value of this differential distance, we must also ensure that we include 
the second nearest hospital for which 
1 0 z   in patient’s choice sets. The same 
argument can be made when the hospital under examination is the nearest hospital 
that has each of the other hospital characteristics (i.e. 
1 1 z  , 
2 0 z  , 
2 1 z  ). Thus, the 
following alternatives must also be included in all patients’ choice sets, even if they 
are beyond the cut-off distance:  the second nearest non teaching hospital (
1 0 z  ), the 
second nearest teaching hospital (
1 1 z  ), the second nearest small hospital (
2 0 z  ), 
the second nearest big hospital (
2 1 z  ). 
 
Where patients actually travel further than 100km, we extend their choice set to 
additionally include the actual hospital attended. Each patient will thus always have at 
least four to nine alternatives within their choice set. 
 
Model fit 
The proportion of correct predictions is around 75%.
65 The results are robust to a 
range of model specifications including: (1) whether we allow model parameters to be 
region-specific; (2) the extent to which we expand patients’ choice sets beyond the 
minimum set of hospitals required to estimate the model; and (3) whether we enter 
distance variables as linear or non-linear variables. Hospital HHIs based on predicted 
data are lower in value than HHIs based on actual data. The most important 
coefficient estimates are for distance, so that if patients were allocated to hospitals 
solely on a distance basis then hospitals would appear more competitive than they 
actually are. Actual choice of hospital is therefore based on additional factors that we 
have excluded from the model and these additional factors lead hospitals to become 





                                                 
65 Parameter estimates available from the authors. 